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Hegel and The Problem of Poverty
*Thom BROOKS
Introduction
G. W. F. Hegel's Philosophy of Right is one of the most famous texts in the 
history of philosophy. It is also a controversial work that has led to several 
important debates, such as between politically right and left Hegelians, the 
metaphysical versus non-metaphysical approaches and the systematic 
1
versus non-systematic readings . Not all of these debates continue today 
although all exposed very different understandings of Hegel's philosophy at 
a fundamental level. 
One interesting issue is Hegel's so-called problem of poverty. The 
problem is not only that Hegel believes the ideal state would be a political 
community where some would live in poverty. Instead, the issue is that 
Hegel's ideal calls for each of us to be at home and reconciled to our political 
community, but some of us cannot be because of poverty. The problem, for 
Hegel, is that he seems to lack any convincing solution to this problem. In 
other words, poverty is a problem, but it is a problem Hegel recognises and 
seems unable to solve. This is a major concern because it might entail the 
ideal state would also be politically unstable to some degree no matter our 
efforts. What makes this issue especially interesting for my purposes is that 
it is a topic where Hegel scholars sometimes with very different approaches 
to the study of Hegel's philosophy will agree on what this problem is. The 
debate about Hegel's problem of poverty is largely a discussion about 
possible solutions to it-but everyone seems clear about the problem.
This article argues that the consensus view of most leading Hegel 
scholars is incorrect. Their mistake is in viewing Hegel's problem of poverty 
as a problem about economic poverty. This is reflected in their proposed 
solutions which are presented in an economic light. The mistake is that 
Hegel's understanding of poverty is that it is a form of political alienation. 
1
* Prof. Dr., Durham University, Durham Law School, UK.
 (https://www.dur.ac.uk/law/staff/?id=11140).
   Brooks, Thom (2015) “Hegel and The Problem of Poverty”, Kilikya Felsefe  
   Dergisi, (1) pp. 1-9.
1 On these debates, see Thom Brooks, Hegel's Political Philosophy: A Systematic 
   Reading of the Philosophy of Right. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013.
2 
Economic poverty might make political alienation more likely, but our 
focus should be on addressing alienation. The interesting conclusion is that 
Hegel scholars are correct to believe his problem of poverty lacks a 
convincing solution, but incorrect about what the problem is. This article 
attempts to make this case.
How the Problem is Understood
There are two leading views about Hegel's problem of poverty. The first is 
best represented by Shlomo Avineri and the second by Raymond Plant. I 
consider each of these views here not in order to critique them, but to make 
clear where the debate is in current Hegel scholarship.
Avineri and Plant differ primarily in their understanding of the 
problem's solution: they are generally agreed on the problem. This problem 
is commonly understood as more than an inconsistency in Hegel's political 
thought, but a gap that shows the limits of his political ideal. Hegel claims 
that we should be at home inour social and political world. This idea about 
political reconciliation is not that should agree with every decision of our 
state, but that we come to identify with our social and political institutions. 
For example, I am a British citizen. If reconciled in the way Hegel discusses, 
then the idea is that I will identify myself with British social and political 
institutions. These will have my support over time and I will engage with 
other fellow citizens through them. We need not always agree about 
outcomes, but should be united in engagement with others. Individuals that 
are not reconciled will lack this identity with others and sense of social and 
political connection.
Hegel's problem of poverty is understood as the problem that some 
in society will be unable to achieve reconciliation. This is because 
reconciliation can be denied for persons in poverty. The wider issue is that 
Hegel endorses laissez faire capitalism for his ideal state. Hegel recognises 
that this form of capitalism—notwithstanding whatever merits it may have-
will lead inevitably to some citizens living in poverty because of how 
capitalism operates. 
Now let us turn to this problem and how the two leading views 
grapple with its solution. Avineri (1972) sees this problem as structural. In 
Avineri's view, Hegel's endorsement of capitalism is at the heart of the 
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3problem. It is because he supports capitalism which creates inevitable 
poverty and so guarantees that some citizens will never achieve 
reconciliation with the state. Avineri argues that Hegel has an easy solution: 
abandon capitalism! The argument is that if Hegel abandons capitalism and 
endorses instead a different economic system, such as socialism, that did not 
permit for poverty this could solve Hegel's problem. The problem of 
poverty is an avoidable problem caused by Hegel's acceptance of 
capitalism. If capitalism is replaced, then poverty can be avoided and every 
individual can achieve political reconciliation with the state.
A second leading view is Plant (1981). He argues for a less radical 
solution to Hegel's problem. Plant agrees with Avineri that capitalism 
should be the focus for our reform. However, while Avineri believes it must 
be replaced, Plant claims capitalism need be reformed instead—and so 
Plant does not agree with Avineri that Hegel must reject capitalism to avoid 
the problem of poverty. If the problem is that capitalism can create poverty, 
then how might this be tackled? One idea is Avineri's claim we should 
abandon capitalism for a different economic system. But a second idea is 
Plant's claim that we can reform capitalism so that Hegel can retain it in his 
system, but so the problems faced by Hegel might not arise. 
For example, Plant argues that Hegel's state should provide more 
public sector jobs to accommodate any individuals without work because of 
poor market conditions until these conditions improve so they can return to 
the private sector again. Plant's idea is that the problem of poverty is created 
by a lack of work. But the state can create work for these individuals: this 
can help safeguard citizens from the effects of poverty while keeping all 
citizens productive.
This section should make clear the two different approaches to 
solving Hegel's problem of poverty. Each recognises this as an economic 
problem requiring an economic solution. Avineri claims the problem is 
capitalism itself. A new economic system should be endorsed to replace 
capitalism. A new economic system would overcome what is, for Avineri, 
an economic problem. Every individual might be able to achieve 
reconciliation as a result. Plant argues the problem is capitalism as laissez 
faire capitalism. We do not require a new economic system altogether, but 
only a reformed model of what we have. If capitalism was better regulated 
permitting a larger public sector, then this can provide work where 
Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi Cilicia Journal of Philosophy 2015 / 1 
4necessary for persons lacking it. This economic problem can be solved by an 
economic approach. While Avineri and Plant propose different ways 
forward, each identifies a similar problem and kinds of solutions.
What is the Problem of Poverty?
The problem of poverty emerges over a few pages of Hegel's Philosophy of 
Right. In sections 240 to 248, Hegel presents us with the problem and its 
possible solution. Scholars are not divided on the problem, but disagree 
widely on how it might be solved. Let us now move section by section to 
examine carefully Hegel's explanation to see if it helps us understand where 
the two leading views have gone wrong.
In section 240, Hegel says: 'Since civil society is obliged to feed its 
members, it also has the right to urge them to provide for their own 
2livelihoods' (Hegel 1990: §240A).  This comment indicates a concern about 
individuals being able to feed themselves. Hegel says that 'every human 
being has a right to demand a livelihood from society' (1990: §240A). His 
understanding is not that society must create jobs and wealth out of nothing. 
On the contrary, society must make possible the conditions under which 
individuals can earn a living for themselves. The state makes possible such a 
livelihood, but individuals must come forward and make use of the 
opportunities available to them. He notes briefly here that what is 'at stake' is 
'not just starvation', but 'the need to prevent a rabble' (Hegel 1990: §240A). 
While Hegel has not said anything yet about who the rabble is, he indicates 
that their creation is to be avoided and their problem is more material (e.g., 
'not just starvation). These are important points we come back to shortly.
The following section 241 claims that individuals may be reduced 
'to poverty' by 'physical factors and circumstances based on external 
conditions' (Hegel 1990: §241). Our lack of material wealth might be such a 
circumstance that might reduce us to poverty. However, Hegel is clear here 
that economic reasons alone are not to blame. He says: 'they are more or less 
deprived of all the advantages of society, such as the ability to acquire skills 
and education in general, as well as of the administration of justice, health 
care, and often even of the consolation of religion' (Hegel 1990: §241). 
2  All references to Hegel's Philosophy of Right are to G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the 
   Philosophy of Right, ed. A. W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
   'R' indicates Remarks and 'A' for any Additions.
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lack. For example, access to the courts and medical care suggest that the 
poverty Hegel has in mind is economic. However, this may not be the best 
reading of this passage. Our enjoyment of religion need not have any cost 
and our lacking skills and education suggests rather an absence of 
capabilities instead. It is true that Hegel discusses these in terms of kinds 'of 
want', but it is also true that he claims the help that those in poverty may 
require includes 'emotion and love' (Hegel 1990: §242). These comments 
do not paint an unambiguous view of poverty as a purely economic problem 
at all. 
The next three sections develop Hegel's notion of the rabble in 
greater detail. Section 243 claims that an unrestricted civil society and its 
capitalist marketplace will contribute to an expanding number of 
individuals taking part and increasing industry (Hegel 1990: §243). But 
Hegel further claims that this will lead to an 'accumulation of wealth with 
negative consequences for many workers (Hegel 1990: §243). These 
consequences are that an expansion of industry and workers will contribute 
to greater specialisation leading to more individuals becoming ever more 
dependent on others as each pursues a greater 'limitation of particular work' 
(Hegel 1990: §243). This is a problem for Hegel because it 'leads to an 
inability to feel and enjoy the wider freedoms' arising within civil society 
more widely (Hegel 1990: §243). In other words, increasing 
industrialisation does not lead to more of us doing the same work, but more 
of us specialising in individual work that ties us each together in an intricate 
web of connections that can be difficult to fully appreciate. Our work can be 
a source of liberation and fulfilment, but also a cause of our feeling trapped 
and even disconnected as wealth concentrates in fewer hands. Hegel says 
later that 'this shows that, despite an excess of wealth, civil society is not 
wealthy enough…to prevent an excess of poverty and the formation of a 
rabble' (Hegel 1990: §245).
Hegel's most famous comment on poverty captures why this is a 
problem: 
When a large mass of people sinks below the level of a certain 
standard of living that feeling of right, integrity and honour 
which comes from supporting oneself by one's own activity and 
work is lost. This leads to the creation of a rabble, which in turn 
makes it much easier for disproportionate wealth to be 
concentrated in a few hands (Hegel 1990: §244).
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of poverty is an economic idea. It seems inescapable that poverty is linked 
here with individuals falling below 'a certain standard of living'. While a few 
become disproportionately wealthy, these resources are denied to the 
greater majority. Poverty seems clearly about people lacking sufficient 
resources to enjoy minimally decent lives.
It is easy to see why most Hegel scholars accept either the Avineri or 
Plant interpretations. Hegel appears critical of capitalism's potential for 
alienating the workers it ought to be liberating through the impersonal 
connections between workers and their work it creates-and this is manifest 
in wealth becoming concentrated in the hands of the few at the top at the 
expense of the many on the bottom. Avineri's critique that we should address 
this problem through adopting a new system of economic exchange that can 
overcome these concerns looks promising. In contrast, Plant can argue the 
concern is not so much capitalism per se, but 'unrestricted' capitalism. If we 
want to solve Hegel's problem of poverty, then we do not require the more 
extreme solution proposed by Avineri. Instead, we can accept Plant's more 
moderate proposal that we support a sufficiently regulated market economy 
and this can be our way of overcoming the problems identified by Hegel. 
These economic interpretations of Hegel's problem of poverty gain further 
support from his comments that a solution is to establish foreign colonies so 
that  more can 'gain satisfaction for their needs by their work' (Hegel 1990: 
§248A). But is this correct?
Poverty Beyond Economics
Both Avineri's and Plant's readings rest on an important mistake. They 
understand Hegel's problem of poverty as an economic problem requiring 
an economic solution. I have already considered their arguments and the 
evidence in support of their positions. In this section, I explain why this 
shared understanding of Hegel's problem is incorrect. This has 
consequences for the conclusions we should draw from Hegel's analysis.
We should first return to Hegel's most famous comment on poverty. 
Recall his statement that what people in poverty lose is 'that feeling of right, 
integrity and honour' (Hegel 1990: §244). This claim indicates that poverty 
is not a mere fact of how many resources we have, but a sense we have about 
ourselves. 
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this section. Hegel says: 'Poverty in itself does not reduce people to a rabble; 
a rabble is created only by the disposition associated with poverty, by 
inward rebellion against the rich, against society, the government, etc.' 
(Hegel 1990: §244A). This is a highly important passage that must be 
unpacked. Hegel is now explicit: poverty is not an economic status, but a 
state of mind. It is not the amount of money in our pockets or property we 
possess that determines whether we are in poverty, but our dispositions. 
Anyone with any amount of wealth might possess such a state of mind. To 
some degree, any one of us might be in poverty in the sense implied here.
Poverty is a specific mind-set and it is often associated with being 
poor. Hegel is clear that our being poor is relative to the society we find 
ourselves in (Hegel 1990: 244A). To be poor in one country might be more 
affluent in another. But the question is: so what is this mind-set that defines 
poverty?
The answer is Hegel's comment about 'inward rebellion'. To be in 
poverty is to adopt a rabble mentality. This is a feeling -a feeling of 
alienation from others. To be in inward rebellion is to not identify oneself 
with others. A rabble view the wider society as an other. Society's laws 
might constrain all, but a rabble mentality would claim they are constraints 
created and imposed by others on them. Society is viewed as 'them' in a them 
versus us conflict. This division will appear unbridgeable for the alienated: 
society and its laws are determined by others without acknowledgement -or 
perhaps not even awareness- of 'our', the rabble's, wants and aspirations. No 
matter how loud the rabble voice, the rabble believe it will not be heard (see 
Brooks 2015).
None of this might be true. Society may extend to all -rabble or not- 
an equal vote and equal opportunities for participation. The problem is that, 
for the rabble, what counts is the feeling of self-identity their have: their 
conviction about their social and political alienation. Alienation is not a 
simple question of whether people enjoy certain opportunities, but the more 
difficult issue of whether people possess a conviction about themselves in 
relation to others. It can be easier to solve problems associated with political 
justice than personal convictions. For example, we can ensure each person 
has a single vote and political parties a fair hearing in public elections. But 
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poverty has a further counterintuitive consequence. Hegel's rabble includes 
not only those in economic poverty, but also the fabulously wealthy: rabble 
membership may be mostly composed of persons from each group. This is 
because the very wealthy can share in a sense of alienated disconnection that 
the very poor can possess. Each can look to laws, institutions and even 
social mores as rules that are by others, for others and should not apply to 
them.
Conclusion
This article has focused on Hegel's problem of poverty. There are two 
leading interpretations proposed by Avineri and Plant. Each draws different 
conclusions, but they both see Hegel's problem of poverty as an economic 
problem that requires an economic solution. There are no shortage of 
comments by Hegel that associate a lack of economic wealth with poverty 
used to support these interpretations.
The problem is that Hegel's understanding of poverty is about our 
convictions, not our resources. What makes us a rabble is a feeling of 
disconnection from others and not the fact that we may own less than others. 
This disconnected feeling is a conviction about our alienation from others. It 
is true that economic hardship can make this sense of alienation more likely, 
but: first, economic wealth does not determine whether anyone is in 
Hegelian poverty and, secondly, poverty is a state of mind that anyone can 
possess including the very wealthy.
What is interesting about this view is it leads to a significant 
reimagining of the kind of problem that poverty is for Hegel's political 
philosophy. It is widely thought to be a problem that Hegel indicated, but 
does not solve. I have already argued that Hegel's understanding of poverty 
as purely economic is a mistake. However, the claim that being a member of 
the rabble is made possible by our having a conviction about ourselves in 
relation to others is a more accurate depiction of why poverty is a problem 
for Hegel, but it remains a problem for which Hegel offers no convincing 
answers. 
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